

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MCHUGH
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

AND

GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

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Introduction

In the past decade, America's Army has been challenged and prevailed in some of the most daunting tasks in the history of our military. Soldiers from the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve demonstrate indelible spirit, sacrifice and sheer determination in protecting our national interests and supporting our friends and allies around the world.

In the coming years, our top priorities will be to maintain our combat edge while we reconstitute the force for other missions and build resilience in our people. The Army has made significant progress in restoring balance through the four imperatives we identified in 2007- sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. We are on track to achieve a sustainable deployment tempo for our forces and restore balance to the Army beginning in FY 12. We successfully completed combat operations in Iraq, transitioning from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn while executing one of the largest wartime retrogrades in the Nation's history. Operation New Dawn marks the beginning of a new mission for our Army while demonstrating our ongoing commitment to the government and people of Iraq. Concurrently, we surged Soldiers to Afghanistan in

support of a new strategic direction in this vital theater. Even with all we have done, there is still much work to do.

The war is not over yet, and we remain in an era of persistent conflict facing an uncertain and increasingly complex strategic environment. Hybrid threats made up of conventional, irregular, criminal and terrorist capabilities will continue to test our forces. These threats will avoid our strengths and attack us asymmetrically. Therefore, we must continue to organize our formations, update our doctrine and prepare our forces for the full spectrum of operations.

Additionally we remain aware of the difficult economic conditions at home. These conditions will drive our efforts to transform our generating force into an innovative and adaptive organization. We must adapt our institutions to effectively generate trained and ready forces for Full Spectrum Operations, while seeking ways to improve efficiency and reduce overhead expenditures that demonstrate wise stewardship of our taxpayers' dollars. With the continued support of the American people and Congress, we remain committed to the readiness and well being of our Soldiers, Civilians and Family members. As the Strength of the Nation, the American Soldier is the centerpiece of everything we do-

Where We Have Been

For nearly a decade, the Army has been operating at an exhausting pace. High operational demands have stressed our ability to supply trained and ready forces during most of this period. The result was an Army out of balance, lacking strategic flexibility to respond to other

contingencies and lacking the ability to sustain the all-volunteer force. This past year the Army continued to make great strides toward restoring balance to the force.

The drawdown in Iraq and change of mission from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn on September 1, 2010 represented a significant accomplishment made possible by the extraordinary determination, hard work and sacrifice of American Soldiers, their Families and the Civilian workforce. During Operation New Dawn, the remaining 50,000 U.S. service members serving in Iraq will conduct stability operations focused on advising, assisting and training Iraqi Security Forces, all while engineering the responsible drawdown of combat forces in one of the largest and most complex logistical operations in history. The Army closed or transferred over 80 percent of the bases to Iraqi authorities, reduced the number of U.S. personnel by over 75,000 and redeployed more than 26,000 vehicles.

Concurrently, we implemented the President's direction to surge an additional 30,000 Soldiers to Afghanistan to defeat the al-Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban insurgency. This surge enabled our Soldiers and our Afghan partners to take back insurgent sanctuaries in the traditional insurgent Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan. Additionally, during this past year our forces have trained 109,000 Afghan National Army Soldiers, as well as 41,000 Afghan National Police. As a result, we are beginning to see an improvement in Afghan National Security Force capability.

Last year, the Army responded to three major natural and environmental disasters while continuing to support homeland defense. The Army provided humanitarian relief in response to the devastating earthquake in Haiti, the summer floods in Pakistan and the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Additionally, our National Guard Soldiers were sent to the Nation's southern border to help control increased illegal activity. They assisted federal law enforcement agencies responsible for drug enforcement and the security of our borders.

During this past year the Army continued to increase its knowledge and understanding of Full Spectrum Operations. Last October, the Army conducted the first full spectrum rotation against a hybrid threat at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. This was the first time in five years that we have been able to conduct a training rotation focused on anything other than operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we continue to build dwell and increase the time Soldiers have at home, more units will conduct full spectrum training rotations at the Combat Training Centers increasing our ability to hedge against the unexpected and restoring strategic flexibility to the force.

Though we remain heavily engaged, the Army is regaining balance. We are starting to be able to breathe again. We must continue efforts to fully restore balance while maintaining the momentum we have achieved over the past four years. The strategic environment continues to be complex, and the stakes are too high to become complacent or underprepared.

Restoring Balancing

Restoring Balance

Through the continued support of Congress and the American people, we will lessen the stress on America's Army by focusing on the imperatives we established four years ago. We must continue to **sustain** the Army's Soldiers, Families and Civilians; **prepare** forces for success in the current conflicts; **reset** returning units; and **transform** the Army to meet the demands of the second decade of the 21st Century.

Sustain

Our first imperative is to sustain our all-volunteer force. We must reduce the stress on Soldiers, Families and Civilians who have borne the hardship of nine and a half years of conflict. In addition to addressing this high level of stress, the Army invests time, energy and resources into quality of life programs. We must continue to inculcate resilience in the force, providing Soldiers, Families and Civilians the skill sets necessary to deal with adversity.

Goals

The most important component required to restore balance within our Army is to increase the time between deployments, known as dwell time. A study completed in 2009 confirmed what we already intuitively knew: Soldiers require at least two to three years to fully recover, both mentally and physically, from the rigors of a one year combat deployment.

Training and schooling necessary for a professional Soldier to sustain warrior and leader skills are also very important. With these critical considerations, our interim objective is to achieve and then maintain a dwell time of at least two years at home for every year deployed for the active component Soldier and four years at home for every year mobilized for the reserve component Soldier. In 2011 we will examine the cost and benefits of increasing dwell to 1:3 and 1:5 respectively with a nine month Boots on the Ground policy.

In addition to increasing dwell time, the Army must continue to recruit and retain quality Soldiers and Civilians from diverse backgrounds. People are our most important resource, and to sustain an all-volunteer force it is essential to attract those with an aptitude for learning and then retain them as they develop the tactical, technical and leadership skills the Army needs. To grow and develop the Army's future leadership, we need appropriate incentives to encourage sufficient numbers of high quality personnel to continue to serve beyond their initial term of service.

Another important consideration is the health of the force. We must provide our Soldiers and Civilians, as well as their Families, the best possible care, support and services by establishing a cohesive holistic Army-wide strategy to synchronize and integrate programs, processes and governance. There are myriad programs available to accomplish this, such as Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family Covenant and other community covenants. Our focus is on improving access to and predictability of services. We will enhance support for the wounded, Families of the Fallen, victims of sexual assault and those with mental health issues. Our effort to build an entire spectrum of wellness --

physical, emotional, social, family and spiritual – will support achieving Army strategic outcomes of readiness, recruitment and retention. The Army is also building resilience in the force by addressing the cumulative effects of nine and a half years of war. We have designed a comprehensive approach that puts mental fitness on the same level as physical fitness by establishing a Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, developing Master Resiliency Trainers and implementing a campaign for Health Promotion and Risk Reduction. The Army has a requisite duty to provide world class health care for our wounded, ill or injured Warriors and to successfully transition these Soldiers and their Families back to the Army or civilian life. This is coordinated through the Warrior Care and Transition Program and ably led by well resourced Warrior Transition Units. Our final and most solemn responsibility is to respect and honor the sacrifice of our fallen comrades by continuing to support the needs of their Families.

Progress

- Achieved 101 percent of recruiting goals for 2010, exceeding both numeric goals and quality benchmarks for new recruits. Over 98 percent of recruits had high school diplomas, the highest percentage since 1992.
- Exceeded reenlistment goals: 114 percent for the active component and 106 percent for the reserve component.
- Decreased accidents and mishaps in several key categories, to include:
 - Off-duty fatalities down by 20 percent
 - On-duty critical accidents down by 13 percent

- Army combat vehicle accidents down by 37 percent
 - Manned aircraft accidents down by 16 percent
- Expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000 Family members, providing unified support and advocacy, and enhancing survivor benefits for the Families of our Soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice.
- Graduated more than 3,000 Soldiers and Civilians from the Master Resilience Trainer course.
- Surpassed one million Soldiers, Civilians and Family members who have completed the Army's Global Assessment Tool to begin their personal assessment and resilience training.

FY 12 Budget Highlights for Sustain

- Provides \$1.7 billion to fund vital Soldier and Family programs to provide a full range of essential services to include the Army Campaign for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention; Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention; and Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. In addition, this funding supports Family services including welfare and recreation, youth services and child care, Survivor Outreach Services and education and employment opportunities for Family members.
- Provides Soldiers with a 1.6% military basic pay raise, a 3.4% basic allowance for subsistence increase and a 3.1% basic allowance for housing increase.
- Continues to fund the Residential Communities Initiatives program which provides quality, sustainable residential communities for

Soldiers and their Families living on-post and continues to offset out-of-pocket housing expenses for those residing off-post.

Prepare

Properly preparing our Soldiers for combat against a ruthless and dedicated enemy is critical to mission success. To do so, we must provide the appropriate equipment and training to each Soldier and ensure units are appropriately manned. Our generating force must continuously adapt – tailoring force packages and quickly readjusting training, manning and equipping – to ensure units have the tools necessary to succeed in any conflict. At the same time, we are aggressively pursuing efficiency initiatives designed to reduce duplication, overhead and excess as well as to instill a culture of savings and restraint.

Goals

The Army identified four key goals necessary to adequately prepare the force for today's strategic environment. The first was to responsibly grow the Army. The Congressionally approved growth of the Army was completed ahead of schedule in 2009. However, after a decade of persistent conflict, a number of other factors – non-deployable Soldiers, temporary requirements in various headquarters and transition teams, our wounded Warriors, elimination of stop-loss – has impacted our ability to adequately man units for deployment. As a result, the Secretary of Defense approved an additional Temporary End Strength of 22,000 Soldiers, 7,000 of whom were integrated in 2010. The Army will return to

the Congressionally approved active component end strength of 547,400 by the end of FY 13. The second key goal addressed training. The Army will continue its commitment to leader, individual and collective training in order to remain mentally, physically and emotionally agile against a highly decentralized and adaptive foe. The third key goal is to provide the Army with effective equipment in a timely and efficient manner. We must implement a new materiel management approach to ensure a timely availability of equipment that not only protects our Soldiers and maintains our technological edge, but does so prudently.

The final and most critical goal is to fully embrace our rotational readiness model – a process we call Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). ARFORGEN will allow a steady, predictable flow of trained and ready forces to meet the Nation's needs across the full spectrum of conflict. Drawing from both active and reserve components, the ARFORGEN process allows us to consistently generate one corps headquarters, five division headquarters, 20 brigade combat teams, and 90,000 enabler Soldiers (i.e., combat support and combat service support). When the current demand comes down, it will allow us to build and maintain the ability to surge one corps headquarters, three division headquarters, ten brigade combat teams and 40,000 enabler Soldiers as a hedge against contingencies. ARFORGEN also allows a predictable and sustainable dwell time for Soldiers. We are currently working to better align the generating force activities and business processes that support ARFORGEN.

Progress

- Trained and deployed seven division headquarters, 16 brigade combat teams, four combat aviation brigades, and eight multi-functional / functional brigades for deployments to Operation New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2010.
- Increased Army inventory of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to 20,000 vehicles.
- Deployed more than 4,300 Army Civilians to Iraq and Afghanistan to support operations in both theaters.
- Discontinued the Stop Loss program; last Soldiers affected by the policy will leave active duty in early 2011.

FY 12 Budget Highlights for Prepare

- Supports a permanent, all volunteer force end strength of 547,400 for the active component, 358,200 for the National Guard and 205,000 for the Army Reserve in the base budget. Provides for a 22,000 temporary increase in the active component in the Overseas Contingency Operations request (14,600 end strength on 30 September 2012).
- Includes \$2.1 billion in procurement for Joint and Combat Communications Systems, including the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and an additional \$1.5 billion in Tactical Wheeled Vehicle modernization funding.
- Provides over \$5.6 billion for the Army to implement training strategies in support of Full Spectrum Operations, designed to prepare units for any mission along the spectrum of conflict, i.e., to

perform the fundamental aspects of offense, defense, and stability operations against hybrid threats in contemporary operational environments.

- Invests \$1.5 billion in 71 UH-60M/HH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters - a critical step in modernizing the utility helicopter fleet. Provides a digitized cockpit, new engine for improved lift and range, and wide-chord rotor blades.
- Devotes \$1.4 billion to procure 32 new and 15 remanufactured CH-47F Chinook Helicopters with a new airframe, Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS), digital cockpit and a digital advanced flight control system, as well as an additional \$1.04 billion to modernize the AH-64 Apache.

Reset

In order to ensure a quality force and a level of readiness necessary for the complex range of future missions, we must continue to reset our units' Soldiers, Families and equipment. This is especially critical given the tempo of deployments. It is a process that must continue for two to three years after the end of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Goals

In order to achieve our reset goals, we continue every effort to revitalize Soldiers and Families by allowing them an opportunity to reestablish, nurture and strengthen personal relationships immediately following a deployment. This includes a review of our procedures for demobilization of reserve component Soldiers. We strive to make this

post-deployment period as predictable and stable as possible. The Army also seeks to repair, replace and recapitalize equipment. As we continue the responsible drawdown in Iraq while simultaneously building up capability to complete our mission in Afghanistan, it is critical that we efficiently replace all equipment that has been destroyed, and that we repair or recapitalize equipment impacted by extreme environmental conditions or combat operations. We will achieve this by adapting the production and manufacturing processes in our arsenals and depots, sustaining existing efficiencies, improving collaboration and eliminating redundancies in materiel management and distribution. This will save the Army money in equipment costs and lessen the strain on the supply lines into and out of combat theaters. We finished the reset pilot program which was designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the reset process, and we will continue to apply lessons learned. As we drawdown in Iraq and eventually in Afghanistan, we will continue to focus on retraining Soldiers, units and leaders in order to effectively reset the force. Too often over the last nine and a half years, the Army had to prioritize deployment over certain education and training opportunities for Soldiers. Given the uncertain strategic environment we face in the future, it is critical that the Army focus on education and leader development as well as provide Soldiers, units and leaders training for full spectrum operations.

Progress

- Sponsored over 2,600 Strong Bonds events designed to strengthen Army Families with over 160,000 Soldiers and Family members participating

- Completed the reset of 29 brigades' worth of equipment, and continued the reset of 13 more.
- Distributed 1.3 million pieces of equipment, closed or transferred 418 bases, drew down 16 Supply Support Activities and redeployed over 76,000 U.S. military, civilian and coalition personnel – all in support of the responsible drawdown of forces from Iraq.
- Deployed Army aircraft with Condition Based Maintenance plus (CBM+) technologies into combat theaters. CBM+ is a proactive maintenance capability that uses sensor-based health indications to predict failure in advance of the event providing the ability to take appropriate preventive measures. A cost-benefit analysis for CBM+ indicated that it has a Benefit-to-Investment Ratio of 1.2:1 given a ten year operations period.

FY 12 Budget Highlights for Reset

- Provides \$4.4 billion to reset Army equipment through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.
- Continues to support training and sustainment of Army forces including individual skills and leader training; combined arms training toward full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased training based on the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

Transform

In order to provide combatant commanders with tailored, strategically responsive forces that can dominate across the spectrum of conflict in an uncertain threat environment, the Army continues to transform our operating force by building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments. We continue to convert brigades to more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular organizations while rebalancing our skills to better prepare for the future. This process not only positions us to win today's conflicts, but it also sets the conditions for future success.

To support the operating force, our generating force must become a force driven by innovation, able to adapt quickly and field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. We must transform the business systems of our generating force by developing a fully integrated management system, improving the ARFORGEN process, adopting an enterprise approach and reforming the requirements and resource processes that synchronize materiel distribution, training and staffing. Transformation of the generating force is key to our ability to effectively manage, generate and sustain a balanced Army for the 21st Century.

Goals

Our plan identifies five goals necessary for effective transformation. The first is completing our modular reorganization. Our plan calls for converting all Army brigades from Cold War formations to more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular formations. Our reorganized

units have proven themselves extremely powerful and effective on today's battlefields. The second goal involves accelerated fielding of proven, advanced technologies as part of our modernization of the force. The Army will develop and field versatile, affordable, survivable and networked equipment to ensure our Soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over any enemy they confront. In the Information Age, the Army must be networked at all times to enable collaboration with Joint, combined, coalition and other mission partners to ensure our Soldiers have a decisive advantage. Third, we must institutionalize the investment in our reserve component and obtain assured and predictable access to them, so that the Army can achieve the strategic flexibility and operational depth required to respond to emerging contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. We are systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing predictability for reserve component Soldiers, Families, employers and communities through the ARFORGEN process. We must modify Army policies and update Congressional authorizations in order to fully realize the potential of an operationalized reserve component and capitalize on their significant combat experience. The fourth goal is the re-stationing of forces and Families around the world based on the Base Realignment and Closure statutes. The Army is in the final year of this complex and detailed five year effort that has created improved work and training facilities for our Soldiers and Civilians as well as new or improved housing, medical and child care facilities for our Families. The last aspect of transformation is Soldier and leader development, which is an important factor in maintaining the profession of arms. Today's Army has a tremendous amount of combat experience that must be augmented with continued professional education and broadening opportunities in order to develop agile and adaptive military and civilian leaders who are able to

operate effectively in Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national environments.

Progress

- Reached 98 percent completion of the modular conversion of the Army. The FY 12 Budget will support completion of this process.
- Restored nearly a brigade combat team's worth of equipment and its entire sustainment package in the Army Pre-Positioned Stocks program for the first time since 2002, greatly enhancing the Army's strategic flexibility.
- Provided identity management capabilities for the Department of Defense (DoD) and other U.S. Government and international partners through the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System. The nearly 1.3 million biometric entries enabled latent identification of approximately 700 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events, 1,200 IED-related watch list hits, and 775 high-value individual captures in 2010.
- Issued Soldiers in the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division the Soldier Plate Carrier System -- a lightweight vest that provides ballistic protection equal to the Improved Outer Tactical Vest in a standalone capacity while reducing the Soldier's load, enhancing comfort and optimizing mobility.
- Fielded 20 million Enhanced Performance Rounds, providing our Soldiers with leap-ahead performance over the previous 5.56mm round. The Enhanced Performance Round provides excellent performance against soft targets, has an exposed penetrator that is

larger and sharper to penetrate hard targets and is more effective at extended ranges. The round is also lead-free.

- Educated over 300 General Officers and Senior Civilian Leaders in business transformation concepts and management practices through the Army Strategic Leadership Development Program.
- Disposed of over 24,000 acres and closed three active installations and five U.S. Army Reserve Centers and is on course to complete BRAC in FY 11.
- Supported DoD in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRN) Consequence Management support required for a deliberate or inadvertent CBRN incident by transforming the CBRN Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) to a new response force within the CBRN Consequence Management Enterprise. The CBRN Consequence Management Enterprise consists of a Defense CBRN Response Force, two Command and Control CBRN Response Elements, ten Homeland Response Forces, 17 CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages, and 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

FY 12 Budget Highlights for Transform

- Provides \$974 million in procurement and \$298 million in continued Research Development Test and Evaluation of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) which will become the cornerstone tactical communications system by providing a single integrating framework for the Army's battlefield networks.

- Provides \$1.04 billion in support of the Army's Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy including \$884 million for the Ground Combat Vehicle and \$156 million for the modernization of the Stryker, Bradley and Abrams combat vehicles.

Strategic Context

As America enters the second decade of the 21st Century, the Army faces a broad array of challenges. First and foremost, we must succeed in Afghanistan and Iraq and continue to combat violent extremist movements such as al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. We must also prepare for future national security challenges that range across the spectrum of conflict. All of this must be accomplished within the context of challenging global economic conditions.

Global Trends

Global trends will continue to shape the international environment. Although such trends pose both dilemmas and opportunities, their collective impact will increase security challenges and frame the conflicts that will confront the United States and our allies.

Globalization has spread prosperity around the globe and will continue to reduce barriers to trade, finance and economic growth. However, it will also continue to exacerbate tensions between the wealthy and the poor. Almost 85 percent of the world's wealth is held by ten percent of the population while only one percent of the global wealth is

shared by the bottom 50 percent of the world's population. This disparity can create populations that are vulnerable to radicalization.

Globalization is made possible through significant technological advances that benefit people around the world. Unfortunately, the same technology that facilitates an interconnected world is also used by extremist groups to proliferate their ideology and foment terrorism. Additionally, there are an increasing number of foreign government-sponsored cyber programs, politically motivated individuals, non-state actors and criminals who are capable of initiating potentially debilitating attacks on the electronic infrastructure of our Nation and allies.

Population growth in the developing world creates new markets, but the accompanying youth bulge can create a population of unemployed, disenfranchised individuals susceptible to extremist teachings that threaten stability and security. Furthermore, the bulk of the population growth is expected to occur in urban areas. Future military operations are more likely to occur in densely populated urban terrain – among the people rather than around them.

The demand for resources such as water, energy and food will increase competition and the propensity for conflict. Even as countries develop more efficient uses of natural resources, some countries, particularly those with burgeoning middle classes, will exacerbate demands on already scarce resources.

Proliferation and failing states continue to be the two trends of greatest concern. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction increases

the potential for destabilizing catastrophic attacks. Meanwhile, failed or failing states that lack the capacity or will to maintain territorial control can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export terror. The merging of these two trends is particularly worrisome: failing states that offer safe haven to terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction. Al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups already seek weapons of mass destruction and will use them against Western interests given the opportunity.

Persistent Conflict

Persistent conflict has characterized the environment in which the Army has operated over the last nine and a half years. This protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors, using violence to further their ideological and political goals, will likely continue well into the second decade of the 21st Century. As a result, our commitments in the future will be more frequent and continuous. Conflicts will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope and will be less susceptible to traditional means of conflict resolution. Concurrently, the Army's Soldiers and Civilians will respond to natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies in support of civil authorities both at home and abroad. The Nation will continue to rely upon the Army to be ready to conduct a wide range of operations from humanitarian and civil support to counterinsurgency to general war.

Violent extremism in various forms will continue to constitute the most likely and immediate threat around the world. A more dangerous threat will come from emergent hybrid adversaries who combine the agility

and flexibility of being an irregular and decentralized enemy with the power and technology of a nation state. These security challenges, in whatever form they are manifested, constitute the threat that the Army and our Nation will face for the foreseeable future. Our Army must remain alert to changes in this volatile environment and build the agility to anticipate and respond to change by maintaining our combat edge.

The Next Decade

The Nation continues to be faced with persistent and ruthless foes that maintain a clear intent to attack us on our soil. Entering the future under these conditions, the Army remains a resilient but stretched force – one that has performed superbly while simultaneously transforming in the midst of a war. The high demand we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan will likely recede over the next few years, but other demands will surely arise. Our Soldiers and Civilians will have more time at home, and that will necessitate a different type of leadership at our garrisons between deployments. Given this future, the Army's challenge in the second decade of the century is to maintain our combat edge while we reconstitute the force, and build resilience for the long haul.

Maintaining Our Combat Edge

Beginning in 2012 we anticipate having about as many BCTs available that are not earmarked for Iraq and Afghanistan as we will have of those deploying. It will be imperative that we remain focused on tough,

demanding training at home station and at our training centers to ensure that our Soldiers and units sustain their combat edge. This training must be accomplished at an appropriate tempo and while meeting the unique challenges associated with increased time at home. Those units who are not deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan will undergo full spectrum training and be available to combatant commanders for security cooperation engagements, exercises and other regional requirements as well as fulfilling our requirements for a Global Response Force and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force. To do this, the Army will need to revitalize home station and leader development programs. We must continue to challenge our young, combat-seasoned leaders who will lead our Army into the second decade of this century and beyond.

Another aspect of maintaining our combat edge involves codifying our experience and lessons learned. Institutionally, we must refine our doctrine and warfighting concepts. While our understanding of Full Spectrum Operations has matured, we must continue to clarify how we define and how we conduct Full Spectrum Operations across the spectrum of conflict from stable peace to general war. As units have more time at home, we will train against the wider range of threats and in a broader range of environments. We will use these experiences to drive the continued adaptation of the Army.

Reconstituting the Force

The Army must reconstitute the force, ensuring excellence in core competencies while building new capabilities to support an uncertain and complex future operating environment. Reconstitution requires not only completely resetting redeploying units, but also continuous adaptation of our forces as we move forward in a period of continuous and fundamental change. While the Army has almost finished transforming to modular formations and balancing the force, we continue to integrate the lessons learned from nine and a half years at war with our expectations of the future. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commenced an in-depth study of our force mix and force design to ensure that we have the right capabilities in the right numbers in the right organizations for the future. We are committed to continually transforming our force to retain the flexibility and versatility it will need for the uncertain future environment.

Another area that will require continual adaption is our mix of active and reserve component forces. The Nation has been at a state of national emergency for nine and a half years. As a result, the Army has had continuous access to the reserve component through partial mobilization. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have performed magnificently, and the relationship between components is better than it has ever been. Our Soldiers have fought together and bled together, and more than ever, we are one Army - a Total Force. Our Nation cannot lose the enormous gains we have made.

Transforming the reserve component into an enduring operational force provides a historic opportunity for the Army to achieve the most cost effective use of the entire force. To that end, the Army recently completed a study of what the future role of our reserve component should be in an era of persistent conflict in which continuous deployment is the norm. The steady, consistent and recurring demand for reserve capabilities during this decade has posed significant challenges for a force organized and resourced as a strategic reserve. In response, the Army recast its reserve forces from the part-time strategic reserve role to a fully integrated and critical part of an operational, expeditionary Army. We are seeking changes to achieve affordable, predictable and assured access to the reserve component for the full range of assignments in the homeland and abroad. One thing is certain across every echelon of this Army; we cannot relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic reserve. The security of the Nation can ill afford a reserve force that is under-manned, under-equipped or at insufficient levels of training and readiness.

The other significant element of reconstitution – modernization – is designed to give our Soldiers a decisive advantage in every fight. The goal of our modernization strategy is to develop a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations that operate on a rotational cycle. This enables us to routinely provide combatant commanders trained and ready forces to operate across the spectrum of conflict. This involves developing and fielding new capabilities while modernizing and recapitalizing old capabilities. Our top two modernization initiatives will be to develop, test and field the network and to field a new Ground Combat Vehicle in seven years. Throughout this process, our industrial base will

continue to identify and adopt improved business practices and maximize efficiencies to repair, overhaul, produce and manufacture in support of modernization and recapitalization efforts.

Building Resilience

As we look toward the next decade, we must also build resilience in our people. The last nine and a half years have taken a physical, mental and emotional toll on our Soldiers, Civilians and Family members. No one has been immune to the impacts of war. This decade of experience, combined with the reality that our Nation is in a protracted struggle, underscores how important it is that we take advantage of our time at home to strengthen our force for the challenges ahead, even as we continue to deal with the continuing impacts of war. Although off-duty, high risk behavior is a continuing challenge, we have made significant progress in the last ten years in reducing accidental fatalities. This highlights the resilience of our force as our Soldiers find healthier ways to handle the stresses of Army life. In addition to the Army Safety Program, last year the Army began two efforts designed to strengthen our Soldiers, Families and Civilians for the challenges ahead: Comprehensive Soldier Fitness and the Army Campaign for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention. We will institutionalize the best of both of these programs into the force over the next year.

The Network

The last nine and a half years of war have demonstrated that the network is essential to a 21st Century, expeditionary Army. Networked organizations provide an awareness and understanding required by leaders who must act decisively at all points along the spectrum of conflict, and by Soldiers on the ground who are executing the mission. The network is also essential for planning and operating with Joint, coalition and interagency partners. The network, therefore, is the Army's number one modernization effort.

The Army's portion of the Department of Defense network, LandWarNet, must be able to provide Soldiers, Civilians and mission partners the information they need, when they need it and in any environment – from the garrison to the tactical edge. To do so, it must be a completely integrated and interoperable network, from the highest to the lowest echelon, forming a true enterprise network. The Army is pursuing critical initiatives to build this enterprise capability, including an enterprise email, calendar-sharing and ID management service (through a partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency), data center consolidation and Active Directory consolidation. These initiatives will increase warfighting effectiveness, improve network security, save hundreds of millions of dollars over the next five years and reduce infrastructure. Additionally, the Army is transforming business systems information technology to better support our business operations and strategic leader decision making.

The Army is also changing the way it supplies network systems and capabilities to operational units by using an incremental approach to modernization. By aligning the delivery of new technology with the ARFORGEN process as it becomes available, we ensure the integration of network capability across our combat formations. This “capability set” approach will field enhanced performance in a more timely and efficient manner.

Ground Combat Vehicle

To operate in austere conditions against a lethal, adaptive enemy, our Soldiers need a fighting vehicle that is capable of full spectrum operations with better levels of protection than our current vehicles. To meet that need, the Army is focused on developing a versatile ground combat vehicle that will meet an array of anticipated future requirements and see its first delivery in seven years. It will provide the needed protection against a variety of threats, including that of Improvised Explosive Devices, and deliver Soldiers to the fight under armor. Even with the significant capabilities that a new ground combat vehicle will provide, it comprises only one element of the Army’s overall combat vehicle modernization strategy. Our strategy also addresses improvements to vehicles like the Paladin howitzer and Stryker combat vehicles, integration of the MRAP into our formations and prudent divestment of obsolete systems.

Strategic Crossroads

Our Nation and its Army are positioned at a unique point in history. This is not quite like any other year. We must now consider the hard-won lessons of recent combat experience, current and anticipated resource constraints and the uncertainty of the future. The decisions we make will have far reaching and long lasting implications. This calls for deliberate and thoughtful choices and actions as we determine where to best invest our Nation's precious resources.

Transforming the Generating Force

Over the course of the past decade, the operational Army has evolved dramatically. The need for change was driven by a fundamental reality: daily contact with a decentralized, adaptive, creative and deadly enemy. The Army's generating force, which prepares, trains, educates and supports Army forces worldwide, is also working to rapidly address the demands placed on the organization by both the current and future operating environments. It has performed magnificently to produce trained and ready forces, even while seeking to adapt institutional business processes.

Furthermore, the Army is working to provide "readiness at best value" in order to help us live within the constraints imposed by the national and international economic situation. In short, the need to reform the Army's institutional management processes and develop an Integrated Management System, while continuing to meet combatant commander

requirements, has never been more urgent. Thus, to enhance organizational adaptive capacity, while wisely stewarding our resources, the Army initiated a number of efforts along three primary business transformation objectives: establish an enterprise mindset and approach; adapt institutional processes to align with ARFORGEN; and reform the requirements and resource process.

To enable business transformation and foster an enterprise approach, we established the Office of Business Transformation and developed enterprise functions that are facilitated by teams of leaders who focus on the domains of Human Capital, Readiness, Materiel and Services and Infrastructure. At the most strategic level, we established the Army Enterprise Board to provide a forum for Army senior leaders to address organizational strategic choices and tradeoffs. Additionally, we established our Business Systems Information Technology Executive Steering Group to facilitate an enterprise approach to information technology investments.

We are working collaboratively to reform our requirements and resourcing process in order to create an organizationally aligned set of capabilities. As part of that effort, we have initiated an Army Acquisition Review. This review will provide a blueprint for actions over the next two years to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army acquisition processes. We've also commissioned a short-term task force to analyze costs, establish credible benchmarks and help us better understand not only where our investment dollars go, but also what we get in return. We are developing a systematic approach to the Army's business processes

that will ensure that innovative ideas and efficiencies influence future budgets.

Furthermore, we instituted a portfolio review process that is bringing discipline to our acquisition programs by evaluating and realigning requirements with the reality of today and what we will need in years to come. This Capability Portfolio Review process is providing an overarching detailed analysis and set of recommendations to revalidate, modify or terminate each of our requirements, including research and development, procurement and sustainment accounts. These reviews are helping us identify gaps and unnecessary redundancies, while ensuring good stewardship of our nation's resources. We are building a foundation that will identify savings, manage strategic risks, maximize flexibility and posture us even more effectively for the future.

Civilian Workforce Transformation

There are approximately 279,000 Civilians in the Army. Adding the Army Corps of Engineers and personnel supported by non-appropriated funds, the number exceeds 335,000 Civilians. That is about 23 percent of our total Army force. Army Civilians live and work in communities throughout our 50 states and U. S. Territories and overseas theaters of operation. They comprise 60 percent of our generating force.

This generating force performs many of the essential tasks that support ARFORGEN so our Soldiers can concentrate on their missions. Army Civilians have deployed and stood in support of our Soldiers during

the most dangerous and difficult periods of conflict. In fact, over 4,300 Civilians deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in 2010. The Nation's ability to sustain the all-volunteer force will be difficult and challenged if we do not prioritize development and investment in our most important institutional asset, our people. Now, as never before, we increasingly call upon our Civilian Corps to assume greater levels of responsibility and accountability at organizations throughout the Army, and we must invest in them accordingly. The goal is to become a generating force driven by innovation, able to adapt quickly and to field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. Therefore, the Army has embarked upon a Civilian Workforce Transformation initiative to pursue five lines of effort.

First, we will integrate requirements determination, allocation and resourcing processes that identify the civilian workforce capabilities. Second, we will improve civilian workforce lifecycle strategy, planning and operations to enhance mission effectiveness. Third, we will establish an integrated management system to support civilian human capital decision making. Fourth, we will deliberately develop Army civilian leaders. Fifth, we will reform the civilian hiring process. By the end of 2011, the Army will implement a comprehensive competency-based Civilian Leadership Development Program and fully implement the Civilian Talent Management Program. These programs will ensure that employees and management understand what is required for success, with realistic career paths and developmental opportunities to achieve success.

The pay-off for this program is four-fold. For Civilians, the transformation will provide an outline for success with the appropriate training and development opportunities to facilitate the achievement of

their career goals within the Army. For Commanders, the Civilian Workforce Transformation will provide the right workforce with the right training and development for the current and future mission requirements. For the Army, it will provide a predictable and rational method to articulate requirements and make decisions about resourcing in a fluid environment. Finally, for the Nation, the transformation will provide the investment in human capital required to effectively manage the institutional Army now and in the future.

Stewardship, Innovation and Accomplishments

Fiscal Stewardship

We take our responsibility to serve as good stewards of the financial resources the Nation has entrusted to our care very seriously, and we are taking action to improve our ability to manage those resources effectively.

To help our leaders and managers make better resource-informed decisions, we have placed renewed emphasis on cost management throughout the Army. At all levels, from installation to Army Headquarters, we have implemented training and professional development programs to give our people improved cost management skills and a greater understanding of the cost implications of their decisions. Training programs include a graduate-level Cost Management Certificate Course for carefully selected mid-level analysts, professional development courses for general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service, training incorporated into existing courses throughout the Army's formal

schooling system and hands-on training in cost-benefit analysis. These programs have reached over 2,700 Soldiers and Civilians, and training continues.

In addition to providing training and professional development, we must give our people the essential tools that will enable them to carry out their cost management responsibilities. Toward this end, we have fielded the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) to more than 11,000 users at 14 major installations. As reported by the Government Accountability Office, GFEBS development is on schedule and on budget. Much more than an accounting system, GFEBS is the Army's new business system. It gives managers a greatly improved capability to manage the cost, schedule and performance of their programs and, at the same time, is the centerpiece in our progress toward full auditability of our financial statements

Energy Security and Sustainability

Energy security and sustainability are operationally necessary, financially prudent and are key considerations for Army installations, weapon systems and contingency operations. Energy security means that the Army retains access to energy and can continue to operate when catastrophe strikes and energy supplies are disrupted, cut off or just plain difficult to secure. To remain operationally relevant and viable, the Army must reduce its dependency on energy, increase energy efficiency, and implement renewable and alternate sources of energy.

The Army has established a Senior Energy Council, appointed a Senior Energy Executive, created an Energy Security Office, and adopted a comprehensive energy security strategy. This strategy will not only lead to energy cost savings but help create a more sustainable force with increased endurance, resilience, and force protection. We will enhance our stewardship of our nation's energy resources and less dependent upon foreign sources of fuel. The Army's logistical tail of the Operational Energy pipeline is a handicap that must be overcome through technological advances. We must leverage technology to improve our agility and flexibility against an irregular and decentralized enemy.

On Army installations, we are developing a holistic approach, called Net Zero, to address energy, water, and waste. Net Zero is a force multiplier enabling the Army to appropriately steward available resources, manage costs and provide our Soldiers, Families and Civilians with a sustainable future. In an era of persistent conflict, with a mission of stabilizing war-torn nations, a true stabilizing factor can be that of appropriate resource management. The Net Zero plan ensures that sustainable practices will be instilled and managed throughout the appropriate levels of the Army, while also maximizing operational capability, resource availability and well-being.

We have taken a significant step by incorporating all fuel costs throughout the lifecycle of the equipment as we analyze various alternatives for modernization programs such as the next ground combat vehicle, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and the Armed Aerial Scout. This

approach enables us to make informed decisions about various alternatives and define energy efficiency performance parameters in capability documents for our program managers and original equipment manufacturers. Of course, not all solutions will involve big pieces of equipment or new vehicles. We are also pursuing technologies on a much smaller scale, such as spray foam tent insulation and shower water recycle systems — investments from which direct energy savings pay off in a matter of months.

We are also working on more efficient generators and power distribution. Development of hardware, software and controls to perform micro-grid implementation is underway for buildings at the Field Artillery Training Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This technology also has potential for use in a deployed operational environment. The Army is preparing to field “smart grid” capabilities for tactical command posts and forward operating base camps that will enable generators to support the larger grid instead of a single end user. As they become scalable and deployable, renewable energy technologies can also be integrated into these smart grids.

The Profession of Arms

The last nine and a half years of conflict have had significant impacts on the Army, its Soldiers, Families and Civilians. Many of these are well documented and are being addressed. There remain, however, other consequences that we seek to understand. We will examine the impacts of war on our profession of arms and take a hard look at

ourselves – how have we changed as individuals, as professionals and as a profession.

The Army is more than a job; it is a profession. It is a vocation composed of experts in the ethical application of land combat power serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people. The level of responsibility is like no other profession – our Soldiers are entrusted to apply lethal force ethically and only when necessary. Also, unlike other professions, the profession of arms is practiced in the chaotic and deadly machinations of war. Along with that awesome responsibility comes both individual and organizational accountability, which we seek to examine as parts of our Profession of Arms.

The American Professional Soldier is an expert and a volunteer, certified in the Profession of Arms and bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the Nation and Constitution. The Soldier adheres to the highest ethical standards and is a steward of the future of the profession. Contrasting this are state, non-state and individual actors who operate outside generally accepted moral and ethical boundaries. Because of this, the Army has received tremendous support from the American people and their elected representatives. We are forever grateful for that support, and we do not take it for granted. We understand that this generous support is predicated on the Army's continued professionalism, guided by our Army creeds, our service oaths and the Army values that anchor our conduct (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage).

In order to examine the impacts of our current experience on the Profession of Arms, the Army will continue a discussion at all levels in which we will ask ourselves three fundamental questions:

- What does it mean for the Army to be a Profession of Arms?
- What does it mean to be a Professional Soldier?
- After nine years of war, how are we as individual professionals and as a profession meeting these aspirations?

The dialogue will help inform our understanding on what it means to be a professional Soldier in an era of persistent conflict.

Conclusion

The professionalism, dedicated service and sacrifice of our all-volunteer force are hallmarks of the Army – the Strength of our Nation. Soldiers, their Families and Army Civilians continue to faithfully serve our country as we prevail in one of the most challenging times in our Nation's history.

The Army is achieving its goals to restore balance in fiscal year 2011. We will be transitioning to a period where we must reconstitute the force for other missions; build resilience in our Soldiers, Families and Civilians and diligently maintain our combat edge. We are modernizing the force for the future by developing and fielding versatile, affordable, survivable and networked equipment to ensure Soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over any enemy they might face.

We are responding to the lessons our operating force learned and the changes it made over the past nine and a half years by adapting the

institutional Army to effectively and efficiently generate trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations. The sector of the Army that trains and equips our Soldiers, the generating force, must be driven by innovation and be able to adapt quickly and field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. We must continue to improve efficiency and reduce overhead expenditures as good stewards of our Nation's valuable resources. We recognize that institutional change is not only about saving money, and efficiencies are not simply about improving the bottom line. Institutional change is about doing things better, doing them smarter and taking full advantage of the progress, technology, knowledge and experience that we have available to us.

With the trust and confidence of the American public and the support of Congress with appropriate resources, America's Army will remain the Strength of the Nation.

2011 Reserve Component Addendum to the Army Posture Statement

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended Section 521 reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using Section 521 reporting criteria. The data included in the report is information that was available 30 September 2010.

Section 517 (b) (2) (A). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	AC in RC (%)*	Army Average (%) **
FY 2009		
Major	(56 of 63) 88.9%	94.1%
Lieutenant Colonel	(16 of 20) 80.0%	87.9%
FY 2010		
Major	(57 of 67) 85.1%	92.1%
Lieutenant Colonel	(10 of 12) 83.3%	88.7%

*Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

**Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517 (b) (2) (B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

	AC in RC (%) *	Army Average (%) **
FY 2009		
Major	(2 of 4) 50.0%	6.0%
Lieutenant Colonel	(0 of 1) 0.0%	7.2%
FY 2010		
Major	(6 of 123) 4.9%	5.7%
Lieutenant Colonel	(0 of 7) 0.0%	10.7%

*Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

**Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 521(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the US Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers: 21,725 or 51.5 percent of which 1,998 were FY10 accessions

Army Reserve officers: 21,378 or 58.8 percent of which 589 were FY10 accessions

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted - 101,896 or 31.9 percent of which 8,281 were FY10 accessions

Army Reserve enlisted - 63,670 or 37.5 percent of which 5,592 were FY10 accessions

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRRA:

In FY10, there were two Service Academy graduates released from active duty before completing their obligation to serve in the Army Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY10, under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRRA the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers to the Army National Guard.

In FY10, under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRRA the Secretary of the Army granted two waivers to the Army Reserve. The waivers afforded Soldiers the opportunity to play a professional sport and complete their service obligation.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRRA:

In FY10, there are no distinguished Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY10, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRRA by a combination of (a) two years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In FY10, there were 20 ROTC graduates released early from an active-duty obligation. The following is a breakdown of the ROTC graduates that are completing the remainder of their service obligation in a Reserve Component.

- a. ARNG: 1
- b. USAR: 19

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

There are no longer active and reserve component associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo. Active component officers no longer concur or non-concur with unit vacancy promotion recommendations for officers in associated units according to section 1113(a). However, unit vacancy promotion boards have active component representation.

In FY10, the ARNG recommended 1,913 ARNG officers (Title 10; Title 32; ADSW; AD; M-Day) for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 1,913. The number consists of 265 U.S. Army Medical Department, 1,595 Army Promotion List and 53 Chaplains. Of the 1,913 promoted officers, 1,053 were M-Day Soldiers consisting of 175 U.S. Army Medical Department, 844 Army Promotion List and 34 Chaplains.

In FY10, the Army Reserve recommended 63 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 63.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In FY10, 1,607 ARNG Noncommissioned Officers received a promotion to the next rank without the required military education (based on a waiver

agreement that extends the time Soldiers have to complete the educational requirement). Of those, 648 completed their military education requirements. The majority of waivers were deployment related.

In FY10, 486 Army Reserve Noncommissioned Officers received a military education waiver (based on a waiver agreement that extends the time Soldiers have to complete the educational requirement). Of those, 257 waivers received approval based on deployment and/or operational mission requirements.

Waiver consideration is case-by-case. The criteria for waiver consideration are: (1) eligible for promotion consideration, (2) recommended by their State (for ARNG), (3) disadvantaged as a direct result of operational deployment conflict, and (4) no available training quota. This includes Soldiers deployed or assigned to Warrior Transition Units (WTU) (Medical Hold or Medical Hold-Over Units) with a medical condition. Some waiver requests did not meet the criteria.

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 114(a) of ANGCRRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S Army Reserve Command. The National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command maintain details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve.)

In FY10, the ARNG had 47,804 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

In FY10, the Army Reserve had 48,229 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) maintains the detailed information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during FY10 pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment after entering the Army National Guard is 131 officers and 265 enlisted Soldiers from all U.S. states and territories. NGB maintains the breakdown by each state. The numbers represent improvement driven by the Recruit Force Pool (RFP) and by miscellaneous administrative actions. The RFP initiative changed the way ARNG accounts for Soldiers. ARNG does not count Soldiers until the accession process is complete and they have an assigned position. Administrative improvements included an aggressive effort to eliminate Negative End Strength (defined as Soldiers who have been on the NOVAL Pay list for three months or more, have expired ETS dates, in a Non-MOSQ status for 21 months or more, or in the Training Pipeline with no class reservation). These improvements helped the ARNG meet the End Strength Ceiling of 358,200 by the end of FY10 by moving those Soldiers into the Inactive National Guard (ING).

The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during FY10 for not completing the minimum training required for deployment after entering the Army Reserve is 30 officers and 62 enlisted Soldiers. Under AR 135-175, Separation of Officers, separation actions are necessary for Officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36 months after

commissioning. Under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel, separation actions are necessary for Soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry training within the first 24 months.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In FY10, there were no waivers granted by the Secretary of the Army for the U.S. Army Reserve or the Army National Guard.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In FY10, 163,457 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 7,936 or 4.8 percent of personnel identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY10, 162,749 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 15,025 or 9.2 percent of personnel identified for review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In FY10, the ARNG identified 7,936 or 4.8 percent of Soldiers for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards; and transferred to a medically non-deployable status.

In FY 10, the Army Reserve identified 15,025 or 9.2 percent of Soldiers for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards; and transferred to a medically non-deployable status.

On 23 August 2010, the Department of Defense implemented a change to how the Army measures Individual Medical Readiness (IMR). The new way of measuring medical readiness by classifying Soldiers into Medical Readiness Categories (MRC) reduced the number of Soldiers considered medically non-deployable (MND) in the reserve component. This information is available through the Army's medical readiness database, MEDPROS.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRRA.

Per January 2007 direction from the Secretary of Defense reserve component unit mobilizations are now limited to 400-day periods, including post-mobilization training time, a 30-day post-mobilization leave and five days out-processing. Timely alert for mobilization—at least one year prior to mobilization—is crucial. Many training tasks previously conducted during post-mobilization occurs in local training areas before mobilization. First Army, in CONUS, manages and directs post-mobilization training for reserve component conventional forces conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized units to deploy. A unit's

post-mobilization training time depends on how many of the pre-mobilization tasks they complete in pre-mobilization. Whatever pre-mobilization tasks they do not complete during pre-mobilization training, they will complete the remaining tasks at the mobilization station.

First Army Pre-Deployment Training in support of Combatant Commanders' guidance identifies four categories of deploying units. CAT 1 includes units that rarely, if ever, travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base (COB/FOB). CAT 2 includes units that will or potentially will travel off a COB/FOB for a short duration. CAT 3 includes units that will travel and conduct the majority of their missions off a COB/FOB. CAT 4 is maneuver units with an Area of Operations (such as BCTs). The pre-mobilization tasks per category increase up to CAT 4. A CAT 4 unit spends between 58-60 training days at mobilization station for post-mobilization training. The target is 45 training days. A CAT 4 unit is required to perform a Combat Training Center (NTC or JRTC) culminating training event (30 days) during post-mobilization in order to meet validation requirements and deploy.

Army goals for post-mobilization training for reserve component headquarters and combat support, and combat service support units range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type/category of the unit, and does not include administrative and travel days. Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of counterinsurgency operations; counter-improvised-explosive-device training; convoy live-fire exercises; theater orientation; rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training; and completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period. Below is an outline of typical post-mobilization periods for various units:

Unit Structure	Post-MOB TNG Days	
	Legacy	Current
Military Police Battalion (I/R)	90	53
Engineer Company (Construction)	90	58
Medium Truck Company	90	49
Transportation Detachment	90	37
Infantry Battalion	174	71
Expeditionary Sustainment Command	168	37

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

During FY10, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's) the ARNG continued to use the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer and Abrams Full Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer, which provide full crew-simulations training for M1A1 and M2A2 units. The ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers for the M2A2 units and cross leveling of the Conduct of Fire Trainer XXI for M1A1 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer-Situational Awareness (COFT-SA) and Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (CAGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2 crews.

In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT with geo-specific databases provides commanders with unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, all 54 States and Territories have received this capability, providing a mobile training capability available to all Soldiers throughout the ARNG.

To meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, the ARNG is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved marksmanship training device. The ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is completed. The EST 2000 and FATS also provides static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.

The Army Reserve has a number of low-density simulators it employs to reduce expensive "live" time for unique combat service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel

captains but the entire crew of Army watercraft. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator for floating watercraft maintenance units.

The reserve components supplement their marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills, diagnose and correct problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills. The ARNG has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition. EST 2000 systems have been fielded to many Army Reserve Engineer and Military Police organizations to enable full use of its training capabilities by units with high densities of crew-served weapons their at home stations.

The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES) supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction, classification, prevention and reporting of Improvised Explosive Devices. The ARNG also continues to field IEDES kits. The configuration of IEDES kits are set to simulate Small, Medium, Large, and Extra Large Explosive signatures. The IEDES kits provide realistic battlefield cues and the effects of Explosive Hazards to Soldiers in both a dismounted and mounted operational status.

The ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability through the Battle Command Training Capability Program (BCTCP). This program provides live, virtual, constructive and gaming (LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile training teams. Units can also train at Battle Command Training Centers (BCTC). The BCTCP consists of three BCTCs at Camp Dodge, IA; Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; and Fort Leavenworth, KS, and a regional Distributed Mission Support Team (DMST). The Army Campaign Plan 2010 requires the ARNG to train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The BCTCP synchronizes ARNG battle command training capabilities to help units plan, prepare and execute battle staff training. The objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and trained operators during pre- mobilization training.

In order to provide the critical Culminating Training Event for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Cycle, the ARNG has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater immersed, mission focused training event to certify company level proficiency prior to entering

the ARFORGEN Available Force Pool Defined as Certified Company Proficiency with demonstrated Battalion Battle Staff proficiency, competent leaders, and trained Soldiers prepared for success on the battlefield.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information:

Readiness tables are classified. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The states do not capture this data.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment

of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During FY10, Army National Guard Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted inspections of the Army National Guard. The total number of ARNG units that were inspected were 1,193, plus an additional 26 United States Property and Fiscal Offices (USPFOs), totaling 1,219 inspections. Regular Army Officers assigned to the respective States and Territories as Inspectors General executed the inspections. The Department of the Army Inspector General, 1st US Army, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM); and various external inspection agencies conducted the remaining 128 inspections. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections did not receive a pass / fail rating. Requests for inspections results must go through the Inspector General of the Army.

During FY 10, the Chief, Army Reserve, directed the Inspector General to conduct special assessments in the areas of Rear Detachment Operations (RDO) and Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PHDRA). Commissioned officers of the Army Reserve inspected 81 units. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these assessments did not receive a pass/fail rating. Requests for inspections results must go through the Inspector General of the Army.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and US Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and US Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the US Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or US Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRRA.

There are no longer formal ground combat active or reserve component associations due to ongoing theater operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.

First Army, as FORSCOM's executive agent, and the 196th Infantry Brigade, as U.S. Army Pacific's executive agent, executes the legislated active duty associate unit responsibilities through both their pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with reserve component units. When reserve component units mobilize, they are thoroughly assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training by the appropriate chain of command, and that assessment is approved by First Army or USARPAC as part of the validation for unit deployment.

Validation of the compatibility of the Reserve Component units with the active duty forces occurs primarily during training and readiness activities at mobilization stations, with direct oversight of First Army, USARPAC, and FORSCOM.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the US Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

Title XI (FY 10) Authorizations				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	97	110	8	215
TRADOC	50	3	0	53
FORSCOM	979	2165	101	3245
USARPAC	30	49	1	80
TOTAL	1156	2327	102	3593

Title XI (FY 10) Assigned				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	21	117	1	139
TRADOC	36	3	0	39
FORSCOM	671	2296	83	3050
USARPAC	31	54	1	86
TOTAL	759	2470	85	3314

As of September 30, 2010, the Army had 3,314 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. Army G-1, and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The states do not capture this data.